When Procedures Fails to Become Practise

The existence of a well-documented system does not necessarily mean that it is working effectively in practice.

In ship management, procedures, checklists and reporting requirements are essential elements of operational control. Yet one recurring challenge is the gap between the procedures established by shore management and their actual implementation on board.

Procedures may be available but not consistently followed. Reports may be submitted late, limiting the office's understanding of actual vessel conditions. Meanwhile, similar deficiencies may continue to reappear because previous findings have not been reviewed or corrected effectively.

These challenges should not automatically be attributed to a lack of discipline among shipboard personnel. They should also encourage management to examine the systems and working practices that influence implementation.

1. When Procedures Become an Administrative Burden

Procedures, forms and checklists support consistency, safety and compliance. However, excessive, repetitive or unnecessarily complicated documentation can create a significant administrative burden.

Masters and officers already carry considerable responsibilities, particularly during demanding operational periods. Repeated data entry and multiple forms containing similar information can consume valuable time without necessarily improving operational control.

The solution is not to remove essential procedures or safety controls indiscriminately. Management should identify unnecessary duplication and ensure that every requirement serves a clear purpose.

“A good procedure should support the work it is designed to control, not create unnecessary work around it.”

2. Designing Procedures Around Operational Reality

Regular visits by shore-based superintendents should serve a purpose beyond inspecting records or verifying compliance. They should provide opportunities to discuss whether procedures remain practical and effective in real operating conditions.

Masters and officers need an environment in which they can provide honest feedback about unnecessary duplication, administrative difficulties and procedures that do not adequately reflect operational realities.

Feedback must be evaluated carefully, particularly where statutory obligations and critical safety controls are concerned. The objective is to distinguish necessary controls from unnecessary complexity.

3. Reporting Is Part of Operational Control

Timely reporting connects the vessel with shore management. When reports are delayed or incomplete, the office may lack a sufficiently current picture of operational conditions, outstanding deficiencies and emerging risks.

Reporting systems should minimise duplicate work, establish clear responsibilities and enable the timely communication of important information. Digital tools may help, provided they are practical and properly supported.

Information has limited value if it is collected but does not lead to appropriate management attention, decisions or action.

4. Recurring Deficiencies: Are We Correcting the Problem?

When the same deficiency appears repeatedly on one vessel or across several vessels, the organisation should look beyond the immediate finding. The original corrective action may not have addressed the underlying cause.

A meaningful review should examine why the deficiency occurred, whether the corrective action addressed its causes, and whether the change produced the intended result.

Responsibility, deadlines and a method of verifying effectiveness should be clearly established. Lessons from one vessel should also be considered for other vessels where the same risk may exist.

“The true measure of corrective action is not the closure of a finding, but the effectiveness of the improvement that follows.”

5. Safety Is a Shared Responsibility

Deficiencies arising on board should not automatically be treated as the responsibility of shipboard personnel alone. Safe operations depend on cooperation between the vessel, shore-based management and the wider organisation.

Masters and officers must carry out their duties, follow applicable procedures and report concerns. Superintendents should provide guidance, verify implementation and help resolve operational difficulties. Management must ensure that appropriate systems, resources and oversight arrangements are available.

A safety committee can bring these responsibilities together by encouraging open discussion, examining recurring deficiencies, agreeing on improvements and monitoring whether actions deliver meaningful results.

Shared responsibility does not remove individual accountability. It ensures that individual duties are supported by an organisation willing to identify systemic weaknesses and address them collectively.

6. Management Commitment Must Be Demonstrated Through Action

Safety committees may identify problems and propose improvements, but progress remains limited if the organisation is unwilling to provide the necessary resources or approve justified safety-related expenditure.

Safety improvements should not automatically be regarded as an additional burden. They are part of maintaining effective risk controls and supporting safe operations.

Recommendations should be assessed for their risks, benefits, feasibility and resource requirements. Where a proposed measure cannot be implemented as submitted, management should ensure that the underlying risk is addressed through an appropriate alternative.

Reviews must go beyond producing records for audits and certification. Findings, unresolved actions, resource constraints and decisions requiring management attention should be communicated clearly and honestly.

“Management commitment is demonstrated not only by the policies it approves, but also by the decisions it makes, the resources it provides, and the improvements it ensures are completed.”

7. From Compliance to Continuous Improvement

Effective operational culture requires practical procedures, timely reporting, meaningful engagement between ship and shore, effective corrective action and management support.

Simplifying documentation without maintaining essential controls is not an effective solution. Conducting ship visits without listening to feedback will not improve procedures. Recording corrective actions without verifying their effectiveness will not prevent recurrence.

Operational thinking means understanding the relationship between people, procedures, information, decisions and organisational support rather than treating each element as a separate administrative requirement.

Conclusion: A System Must Learn to Become Effective

An effective ship management system cannot be measured simply by the number of procedures issued, forms completed, reports submitted or findings closed.

Its real value lies in whether these arrangements improve operational discipline, provide reliable information, support sound decisions and prevent recurring deficiencies.

Achieving this requires practical procedures, open communication between ship and shore, effective corrective action and genuine commitment from management to support improvement.

“The strength of a safety management system is demonstrated not by how much it documents, but by how effectively it learns, improves, and protects the people and operations entrusted to it.”